Th e appalling treatment of migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who constitute 80 per cent of the population and 95 per cent of the workforce, has largely escaped international scrutiny. Th e paper analyses the failure to protect migrant workers' rights in the UAE from a domestic and an international perspective. It outlines the extent of the abuses and demonstrates how the state's weak domestic laws have been further undermined by poor enforcement mechanisms and a lack of political will to address the issue. It examines violations of international human rights law and possible avenues of redress, notably those relating to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, one of only three international human rights treaties that the UAE has ratifi ed. Furthermore, the paper will argue that the UAE's exploitation of the relative economic weakness of its South Asian neighbours has led to a situation that can be characterised as bonded labour of migrant workers, a form of slavery as defi ned under international law. It will be concluded that domestic labour provisions in the UAE will never be suffi cient to provide basic rights to migrant workers due to the de facto control of the private sector by the public sector. Th erefore, concerted international attention and pressure will be required to improve a situation in which over two million workers live in terrible conditions, wholly at odds with the wealth and luxury of the country they have helped to build.
Introduction
Since the fi rst oil fl owed from the Umm Shaif off shore fi eld in 1962, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), comprising seven semi-autonomous emirates, has seen phenomenal economic growth. Th e UAE had an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota of 2.53 million barrels per day in May 2007, making it the third largest producer of oil and gas in the world, after Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively.
1 Th e former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently described Dubai -the most high profi le, although certainly not the richest of the emirates -as "one of the world's greatest economic miracles". 2 By contrast, the sizeable South Asian workforce, whose labour has contributed enormously to the growth and without whom the vast development could not have taken place, has not shared in the wealth. Exact fi gures are not available, but according to Human Rights Watch, "95 percent of the UAE's labor pool, some 2.7 million workers, are migrants", 3 with the offi cial text Doing Business with the UAE stating that "the expatriate population of the UAE is close to 80 percent. Most are from the sub-continent". 4 Th us, millions of South Asians currently reside in the country as migrant workers, principally Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Nepalese and Sri Lankans. 5 According to two recent country reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit on the UAE: "Expatriate workers, and particularly low-skilled employees from Asia, have few rights"; 6 and "traditionally, low-paid expatriate workers have enjoyed few, if any, rights in the UAE". 7 Exploitation of these workers, ranging from non-payment of wages to physical abuse, is not simply commonplace or widespread, it is systematic. Th e UAE's labour laws are wholly biased in favour of employers, and the mechanisms used to enforce the laws are ineff ective. Th e government agency in charge, the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, has neither the ability nor the willingness to execute its brief. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the government as a whole, far from acting to protect workers, is an active participant in the abuse, profi ting directly from a system which keeps a large migrant workforce in conditions of bondage. Human Rights Watch, in its March 2007 commentary on the most recent proposed draft labour laws, identifi es the areas in urgent need of further reform as including:
the exclusion of provisions on workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively; the prohibition of strikes; the exclusion of certain categories of workers, such as domestic and farming and grazing workers, from the protections of the labor law; ambiguity regarding the minimum age of employment; the prohibition of women from certain categories of work; the absence of provisions banning the confi scation of passports and other identity documents and requiring employment contracts to be made available in workers' native languages; and inadequate and unenforced penalties for violations of the law. 8 Th is system of exploitation is underpinned by the denial of the most basic of labour rights -the right to freely associate and to bargain collectively. Th e UAE is an ILO member country, 9 but has not signed core ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. Th ese core Conventions are described as being "among the founding principles of the ILO", 10 and form part of the most fundamental international labour law requirements:
Eight ILO Conventions have been identifi ed by the ILO's Governing Body as being fundamental to the rights of human beings at work, irrespective of levels of development of individual member States. Th ese rights are a precondition for all the others in that they provide for the necessary implements to strive freely for the improvement of individual and collective conditions of work.
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Th e paper will analyse the protection of migrant workers' rights in the United Arab Emirates from a domestic and an international perspective. Section 2 will chart the domestic provisions in place in the UAE, including the most recent 2007 proposed draft labour laws, which have been criticised by international nongovernmental organisations. Section 3 will look to the international human rights law that applies to the UAE. While its human rights obligations are limited by 8) Human Rights Watch, supra note 3. 9) International Labour Organisation member countries, available at <www.ilo.org/public/english/ standards/relm/country.htm#N_2_>. 10) International Labour Organisation, Rules of the Game: A Brief Introduction to International Labour Standards , 2005, p. 84, available at <www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/download/ resources/rulesofthegame.pdf>. 11) Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 form part of the core eight ILO documents, available at <www.ilo.org/ public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam/>. the fact that it has not signed the 1993 International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Th eir Families, 12 there are violations of international human rights law taking place, notably the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the UAE has ratifi ed. Th e special mechanisms of the United Nations will also be examined as a possible recourse. Section 4 will describe the situation of migrant workers in the UAE as bonded labour, or slavery. Th e international standards and defi nitions of slavery will be used to support this position. Finally, the paper will seek means of enhancing protection for migrant workers beyond the current domestic laws, which are proving defi cient. It will highlight how domestic provisions will never be enough to provide basic rights to migrant workers due to the de facto control of the private sector by the public sector.
Th e extraordinary wealth of the UAE contrasts sharply with the pitiful conditions of the migrant workers who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population. Unlike many issues which challenge civil society, the inequality and injustice of the situation of migrant workers in the UAE is one which can be resolved. Th ere are more than suffi cient resources in the UAE to provide a basic standard of living for migrant workers. It should become an urgent matter of international concern that this has not been done.
Does the UAE Violate Domestic Labour Law Protecting Migrant Workers?
Th e labour law system currently in operation in the UAE dates from 1980. Th e Federal Law No. 8 for 1980 on Regulation of Labour Relations governs the relationship between the state, the employer and migrant workers. Th e government has repeatedly pledged to implement a new regime of labour regulation in response to criticism; its most recent draft labour law was opened for public review and comment on 5 February 2007. It is unclear how long the review process will take. Th e following section outlines the problems inherent in the 1980 legislation, which is still in force. It concludes by detailing the proposed reforms in the draft law, and explains why the government's proposals are inadequate. Th ese inadequacies were highlighted by Human Rights Watch in a reaction to the government's February 2007 announcement.
Labour law in the UAE is weak and superfi cial. It is designed to circumvent accountability by providing a veneer of regulation to a system that is wholly weighted in favour of the employer. Th e result is untrammelled development at the expense of the most basic human rights of South Asian migrant workers. 
An Overview of the UAE Labour System
Th e recruitment of migrant workers can be carried out either by a recruitment agent, who must be an UAE national, or by an UAE company, whose partners must all be UAE nationals. 13 Written contracts between employers and employees are not a legal requirement; however, in the absence of a written contract, adequate proof of terms of employment must be established if required.
14 Workers must have a work permit, supplied by the employer, often referred to as a sponsor when discussing work permits, to work in the UAE.
15 Th e operation of the system of agencies ensures that workers must spend around two years repaying their loans. Hickox, writing in the Comparative Labor Law Journal , explains the system:
In the U.A.E., for example, a foreign worker must be sponsored by a licensed entity, or an individual sponsored by such an entity, which is registered with the Ministry of Labour … Sponsorship requirements also play a role in the control of foreign workers within the country. Th e transfer of sponsorship is restricted by labor-importing states, so as to ensure that foreign labor remains where it fulfi lls the economic needs, as determined at the time a work permit was issued. In the U.A.E., the guestworker may work for no one other than his sponsor unless he leaves the country and returns under a new sponsorship… Th is system, as applied to lower level positions, has been analogized to slavery . Th e system is so characterized because the employee is tied to one employer… 16 Th e question of slavery is discussed in Section III below. Th e sponsorship system ensures that employees are completely controlled by their employers. Employees cannot change sponsor without the express approval of their employer, 17 and it appears that sponsorship may not be transferred unless the employee falls into one of the applicable categories for transfer and meets certain requirements laid down by the ministries. 18 It is diffi cult to say with any certainty what these categories and requirements are as they are continually being revised. For example, there were three ministerial resolutions alone in 2005, 19 and their interpretation and application is subject to the discretion of the ministries.
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In general, laws exist to regulate maximum working hours, 21 required to work in extreme summertime temperatures. 25 Employers must meet the costs of treatment for work-related injuries, 26 and in the event of a work-related death, the members of a deceased worker's family are entitled to compensation.
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Workers are entitled to severance pay, 28 and repatriation costs on completion of a contract. 29 A worker may abandon his work if the employer fails to honour either his contractual or legal obligations to the worker. 30 Trade unions do not exist, and strikes and lock-outs are expressly banned.
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In the case of a collective dispute between the employer and all or a group of the employees, a complaint in writing must be submitted to the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs by the employees.
32 Th e Ministry adjudicates the matter through a Conciliation Board, 33 or in some cases, a Supreme Arbitration Board. 
Enforcement of Labour Law/Th e Ministry of Labour
In their own words, the UAE Ministry of Labour is responsible for "the administration of the labour market and forming and implementing the labour policy in the country". 35 Its aim is to achieve a "balance between the interests of the workers, employers and the society as a whole". 36 In contrast to their stated aims, the Ministry of Labour guards only the interests of public and private enterprises, obstructs the fi ling of complaints and appeals and is incapable of enforcing either their rulings or their directives. Human Rights Watch note that the real test of a country's respect for workers' rights and compliance with international human rights law does not rest solely in the language contained in the country's laws; rather it rests equally in the government's serious enforcement of its laws regulating the conduct of employers, its creation of institutions that fairly resolve disputes between workers and employers, and its aggressive investigation and prosecution of employers who violate its laws. Laws are only as strong as the mechanisms that enforce them, and there is overwhelming evidence that UAE labour law does not, in its realisation, protect migrant workers from exploitative labour practices. Th e only reliable way of keeping track of labour disputes is through the national press since the Ministry of Labour has never released any fi gures on the matter. According to one offi cial, they did not even keep records until September 2005.
38 Th e available information on worker protests probably represents only a fraction of worker abuses. Th ere is a general reluctance on behalf of workers to make a complaint. One Ministry offi cial was quoted in the Gulf News as saying: "[W]e only recognize it [abuses] when there's a complaint, but there's rarely a complaint. Workers are too scared or they've paid money for their visa and they have to pay that back." 39 In addition, all of the English language broadsheets from which reports were taken are based in the emirate of Dubai, 40 which accounts for only 37 per cent of the national workforce.
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Disputes in Abu Dhabi, Umm Al Qwain, Ajman, Fujeirah and Ras Al Khaima are rarely covered. Workers wishing to fi le a complaint frequently encounter diffi culties. Aggrieved employees must submit a written complaint in either Arabic or English, the two offi cial languages of the UAE, to the Ministry of Labour and to their employer. For example, the Gulf News reports how 38 South Asians were prevented from making a complaint because they could not aff ord to pay a AED 20 typing charge. 43 Th e men had instead brought a handwritten complaint, which was rejected. In addition, Ministry staff informed the men that they would each have to submit an individual complaint (and each incur an individual charge), when in fact labour law allows for the submission of joint complaints.
44 Th e men, whose complaint was that they had not been paid for fi ve months (they were reported to be surviving on dates from a farm near their accommodation), were ultimately unable to lodge an offi cial complaint. Four days earlier, Ministry offi cials refused to accept a complaint from the same workers on the grounds that they could not provide proof of identifi cation. Th e reason for this was that the men's employer had confi scated their passports and labour cards, leaving them with no money and no means of even proving who they were. Th e employer admitted to not having paid his workers, citing his own fi nancial diffi culties as the reason. Th e Economist Intelligence Unit, in its country report on the UAE, similarly describes how "[a] series of cases have emerged … in which UAE contracting companies have failed to pay the wages of labourers for months at a time". 45 Even if a complaint is successful, employers may simply ignore the ruling. A group of workers whose complaint had been upheld by the Ministry of Labour made three separate complaints to the police asking them to enforce the Ministry's decision. Th e employer was ordered to pay fi ve months salary and only paid three. He was quoted in the press as saying he "would not pay one dirham" of the extra amount he owed his employees as they were "liars". 46 Th e shortcomings of the complaints procedure are echoed in the appeals procedure. Far from enhancing rights, the Court of First Instance, which represents the fi rst stage of any appeal, acts as a further obstacle to plaintiff s. 47 In order to register a complaint, the plaintiff must provide the following: a fee of AED 500 (USD 136); a deposit of AED 1,000 (USD 272); a letter from the Ministry of Labour stating that a friendly settlement is not possible; two further copies of the original submission to the Ministry of Labour; and a copy of the original Ministry of Labour judgement. In eff ect this means that aggrieved employees may only appeal to the Court with the express approval of the Ministry of Labour.
Th e Gulf News notes that "workers cannot appeal to the Court of First Instance directly", 48 and if the Ministry decides not to hear a case or feels that its decision was fair, workers are denied leave to appeal. In the event that a worker obtains the required documentation from the Ministry, they must then pay AED 1,500 to register their complaint. Given that the majority of cases relate to withheld monies, it is highly unlikely employees have access to such funds. While the AED 500 registration fee is waived in instances of labourers fi ling complaints against their employers, the regulations also state that "if it was proved that the workers who fi led the case have no rights, they will have to pay all the fees for the case". Despite the vague language, the intention is to make workers who lose their appeal liable for all costs. Th us, a revised system which is supposed to provide workers with the right to appeal further strengthens the hand of the Ministry of Labour in stopping cases from reaching appeal. Moreover, it sets fi nancial penalties to discourage workers who are granted leave to appeal from exercising that right.
In addition to managing the complaints procedure, the Ministry of Labour passes directives with the aim "of providing stability, increasing productivity and creating jobs opportunities".
50 Directives appear to be legally binding edicts which do not pass any formal parliamentary process. Th ere is no mechanism to oversee their consistent implementation. As a result, the Ministry's application and supervision of its directives is erratic. Th e following example highlights how the Ministry's response can be decisive when faced with labour protests, but halting and ineff ective when required to protect the health of migrant workers. Th e only conclusion is that the Ministry consistently enforces the directives that protect the interests of employers only.
In May 2006, a committee of 14 offi cials met with representatives from local and federal departments, including the Ministry of Labour, Dubai Municipality and the Dubai Naturalisation and Residency Department, to discuss problems facing the labour market. 51 After the meeting Labour Minister Dr. Ali Bin Abdullah Al Ka'abi stated that the panel had prepared a 29 clause memorandum to be submitted to the Cabinet to deal with labour protests. He indicated that the memorandum included a provision referring workers to court if they protested without a genuine, legal grievance -in his words, "with no right" -or if they damaged property. Th e memorandum also included provisions to allow companies to bring in workers free of charge to replace those who cause problems or protest.
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Th is directive is being fully enforced. On 11 March 2007, local press reported that 3,500 workers from ETA Ascon, with salaries ranging from AED 550 to AED 650 per month, had stopped working, demanding pay raises of between AED 250 and AED 450. Th e workers also wanted annual leave of one month and a return air ticket to their home country. According to a company spokesman, it was a peaceful protest which ended at 1100 with the employees returning to work.
53 Th e following day the same newspaper reported that 200 workers of the same company were to be deported, following riots in which a company bus was damaged and a manager was attacked. No reason was given for the sudden outbreak of violence, but the report did contain details of the off er ETA Ascon made to its 50 employees: a pay increase of two dirhams (USD 0.55) per day and a return air ticket home every two years. Th e paper quoted Abdullah Saeed Bin Suloom, head of the labour inspection unit at the Ministry of Labour and member of the Permanent Committee of Labour Aff airs in Dubai (PCLAD), who was in negotiations with the workers and the company: "Although the workers' claims are illegal, we agreed with the company's raising their salaries before the end of the contract period." 54 By 15 March 2007, a mere three days after the reported riot, 65 workers had already been deported. 55 No reports were made of arrests, trials or convictions, or due process of any kind. Th e Minister of Labour ordered that 250 work permits be issued to the company free of charge to replace the deported workers. He stated that "this is being done to compensate the company", who claimed to have lost four million dirhams as a result of the protest. ETA Ascon is owned by the Al Ghurair family of Dubai. One week later, a senior Ministry offi cial was reported to be instructing labour inspectors not to fi ne companies breaking the Directive.
58 Th e same offi cial stated: "With all due respect to the minister, the decision is great, but where's the staff to implement it?" He claimed that punitive measures to halt company transactions were pointless: "Most companies write a letter to the Ministry asking to reactivate their transactions and we do it after two days. Just two days." Th is was supported by Sulaiman Abdullah, inspections head at the Ministry of Labour, who admitted: "We restart their transactions after they sign a letter agreeing not to break the rule again." 59 A full month after the Directive was announced the Ministry of Labour stated it would fi nally start fi ning companies who were breaking the law. 60 Labour inspectors made 164 visits to companies in July and August -61.5 per cent were found to be breaking the law.
61 Th e law was not continued into September (although the Directive indicated it should), with the Labour Minister Dr. Ali Al Ka'abi saying: "[T]he weather is cooling now, there's no need for it."
62 Th e daily maximum temperature in September is 38.7 degrees as opposed to 40.4 degrees in August. Overall, three of the seven emirates (Sharjah, Ajman and Umm Al Qwain) had no labour inspector to check on implementation of the Directive. 64 Some companies claimed they would rather pay the fi nes -up to AED 600,000 -than adhere to the new Directive. 65 In the end not one company was ever fi ned. A labour offi cial noted the complete absence of suffi cient enforcement mechanisms in relation to the Directive: "We don't have a mechanism, no receipt book, no way of entering information into the computer's system to fi ne the violating companies." Until 25 January 2005, there were only 80 labour inspectors employed to look after the interests of approximately 2,738,000 expatriate workers. On that date, an extra 50 labour inspectors were employed, meaning there are now 130 inspectorsone UAE national inspector for every 21,062 expatriate employees. 67 In August 2005, the Ministry's industrial safety section had to close down due to holiday leave and resignations. A former employee said it had not undertaken a factory or company inspection for years and was ignored by senior offi cials.
68 Th e conclusion is that the Ministry of Labour is not capable of dealing with the severe pattern of worker abuse in the UAE.
Labour Minister Dr. Ali AL Ka'Abi recently claimed his Ministry was "about to complete" a study recommending a new inspection authority to replace the current system. 69 Th ere has been no indication whether such a move will make the radical changes required to cause some redress for migrant workers. According to Human Rights Watch, the problem in the UAE is not merely that these labour abuses occur, but that the government has breached its duty to enforce its own laws and regulate the conduct of employers. We found that the UAE is failing to investigate and prosecute employers who violate labour laws; [and] failing to establish a transparent, well-documented, and accessible system for the resolution of labour disputes. Th e summer working hours issue remains a problem. In June 2006, the year following the initial debacle, the Ministry announced that companies fl outing the rule would be "named and shamed", 71 but not prosecuted. Th e success of this strategy can be gauged by an announcement, almost exactly a year later, from the same minister of labour -midday break violators will be "named and shamed".
72
Th is is redolent of the system of labour regulation in the UAE. A violation of a legal regulation with severe and horrifi c consequences for the health of migrant workers carries a derisory sanction, ensuring almost total non-compliance. Th e rule's impotence was confi rmed in July 2007 with the revelation that municipal workers are not covered. In response the Ministry of Labour stated that all government departments are responsible for their own workers, with a Dubai Municipality offi cial stating that there are regulations for the safety of its workers -but these do not mention the midday break rule. 
Health and Safety Issues
Th ere is evidence that the fi gures for deaths and suicides amongst migrant workers are being manipulated, both by private companies and by the government. Since employers are legally required to report certain work-related incidents to the Ministry of Labour, 74 and to meet the costs of medical treatment and sick leave, 75 it is in a company's interests to not report such cases. In September 2005, 75 construction workers complained to the Ministry about unsanitary living conditions, unpaid wages, poor safety procedures and unpaid medical bills. Workers suff ering cuts from metal grinders had spent weeks unable to work. In addition to having to pay their own medical bills, they did not receive any sickness benefi t, despite their injuries being work-related. During this time they went unpaid. Such practices are illegal, 76 but no action was taken against the company. Th e Economist Intelligence Unit has drawn attention to the link between suicides and work and accommodation conditions in its main report on the UAE:
An Indian worker killed himself after his employer refused to give him Dh50 to visit a doctor … Th e case highlighted the plight of many unskilled foreign labourers in Dubai and the UAE, many of whom go unpaid for months and are forced to live in cramped, poor-quality accommodation. 82 Unfortunately the problem seems to be getting worse. In August 2006, the Indian ambassador to the UAE reported that 100 Indian nationals had committed suicide in the previous 12 months. 83 Relevant offi cials in the UAE have held that suicides are not related to work conditions. According to Brigadier Khamis Mattar Al Mazeina, director of the Criminal Investigations Department in Dubai, most suicides are related to problems in the deceased's home country, and he added: "Most of these people are non-Muslims." Professor Adnan Fadil of the Al Rashad Psychiatric Clinic in Dubai named a number of contributory factors including schizophrenia, alcoholism, homosexuality and AIDS. 84 86 and identifi ed several areas in urgent need of reform which are neglected in the proposed legislation. Th ey include: exclusion of provisions on workers' rights to organise; prohibition of strikes; the exclusion of domestic workers; absence of provisions banning the confi scation of passports; and inadequate and unenforced penalties for violations of the law.
In relation to freedom of association, the response urges the UAE to "amend the UAE labour law to comply with international standards and explicitly protect workers' right to organise. Th e law should provide for the formation of independent unions free from employer and government interference." 87 It has been noted that the UAE, although a member of the ILO, has not ratifi ed core ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. Similarly, Human Rights Watch emphasises the customary nature of the right to freedom of association within international labour standards, quoting the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association that ILO members, by virtue of their membership, are "bound to respect a certain number of general rules which have been established for the common good … Among these principles, freedom of association has become a customary rule above the Conventions." Again, the rhetoric of the government contrasts sharply with the reality. It is difficult not to conclude that the word of the UAE government on labour issues cannot be accepted. Th e inability to form trade unions underpins the entire system of abuse of migrant workers in the UAE. "Without the right to organize", Human Rights Watch notes, "[workers] are signifi cantly impeded from collectively seeking structural reforms". 91 Granting migrant workers the right to collectively bargain would lead to reform in all areas. It is only by granting migrant workers a collective voice that improvements will percolate through the migrant labour system, leading to a basic standard of living for migrant workers and respect for their dignity.
With regard to the right to strike, it is recommended that the draft law be amended "to guarantee workers' right to strike, including by establishing explicit procedures for workers to exercise this right, such as strike voting requirements and strike notifi cation rules".
92 Th e ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has recognised the right to strike as "an essential element of trade union rights", and the ILO Committee of Experts has described the right to strike as "an intrinsic corollary of the right to organize protected by Convention No. 87".
93 Article 162 of the proposed UAE draft labour law eff ectively bans strikes, stating: "It shall be strictly prohibited to engage in a work stoppage, whether wholly or partially, or fi rm shutdown by reason of or during group labour disputes."
94 Anyone who starts a work stoppage may be dismissed (Article 122) and deported (September 2006 Ministry of Labour resolution). 95 Importantly, Human Rights Watch calls for the draft labour law to be extended to domestic workers. Domestic workers are excluded from national labour laws. No reason has ever been off ered for this. Instead, the UAE proposes issuing a standard contract for domestic workers which would off er lower protection than that provided for in the labour laws. Domestic workers presently operate in a vacuum. Th ey are "at particularly high risk of labour exploitation". 96 Furthermore,
[t]he exclusion of domestic workers from national labour laws, while neutral on paper in its focus on a form of employment, has a disparate impact on women and girls since the overwhelming majority of domestic workers are female. Th e lesser protection extended to domestic work refl ects discrimination against a form of work usually performed by women and girls … No legitimate reasons exist for these exclusions. Th erefore the unequal protection of domestic workers under national laws constitutes impermissible disparate impact discrimination on the basis of sex. 102 under which it has not submitted a report. Th e following section will discuss how the relevant United Nations treaty-monitoring bodies have addressed migrant workers' rights in the UAE through the state reporting procedure. In addition, the work of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants will be examined, the fi rst of whom was appointed in 1999. 
Th e International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
104 Some theoretical aspects of the Convention's scope ought to be clarifi ed before stressing its requirements in relation to migrant workers. Article 1(2) provides that the Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made between citizens and non-citizens. However, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the body charged with monitoring the treaty's implementation, has stressed that
[a]lthough some of these rights, such as the right to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be confi ned to citizens, human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all persons. States parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent recognized under international law.
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Under Article 9(1), states parties are required to report to CERD on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures adopted that give eff ect to the provisions of the Convention. In 1995, CERD examined the eleventh periodic report of the UAE.
106 Th e UAE has not submitted a report since, despite the requirement under Article 9(1)(b) that a report be submitted periodically every two years. It is therefore ten years overdue.
CERD has adopted thirty general recommendations since its inception, which promote an expansive interpretation of the substantive obligations contained in the Convention. Th e recommendations enable the Committee to indicate to states parties the scope of the Convention's provisions and to off er guidance on the legal interpretation of the Convention. 107 General recommendations directly aff ect reporting obligations and shape state practice in applying the Convention. Under the Convention, diff erential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such diff erentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.
Th e UAE has recognised in its 1995 report that the reach of the Convention extends to non-citizens as well as citizens. It notes in paragraph 30 of that report:
Th e Constitution affi rms that foreigners residing in the United Arab Emirates are entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms provided for in the international instruments in force or in conventions and agreements to which the Union is a party.
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In 1995, the Committee drew particular attention to the plight of foreign workers in the United Arab Emirates:
With regard to the application of article 5 of the Convention, members of the Committee asked to what extent foreign workers -who, according to some sources, made up 80 per cent of the total labour force -were entitled to have their children join them and to have them educated in their own language, and whether those children were free to practise their religion. Th ey also asked which countries had bilateral agreements with the United Arab Emirates regarding the status of foreign workers and what was the content of those agreements. Th e members of the Committee expressed their deep concern at information from various sources that foreign workers, particularly women from Asian countries, were subjected to inhuman treatment, and asked for clarifi cation in that regard. Th ey also asked whether aliens living in the United Arab Emirates had the right to assemble freely and practise their culture.
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Due to the unsatisfactory nature of the replies received, the Committee's Concluding Observations expressed [k] een concern … as to the allegations of ill-treatment of foreign workers, including women domestic servants of foreign origin.
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Th e continued absence of a periodic report from the UAE since 1995 means that the UAE's failure to implement the Convention in its treatment of migrant workers has not been highlighted. In the intervening ten-year period, CERD has indicated increased concern with racially discriminatory practices against non-citizens in violation of the Convention, through General Recommendation XXX. Furthermore, the Convention requires states parties to prohibit racial discrimination in the provision of the economic, social and cultural rights of Article 5(e), which include: "Th e rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration." 114 Using General Recommendation XXX as a template, three instances of discrimination against non-citizen workers in the UAE will be briefl y examined: housing, access to justice and minimum wage proposals.
Article 5(e)(iii) of the Convention holds:
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (…) Th e right to housing.
General Recommendation XXX specifi cally underlines the application of the right to housing to non-citizens in its paragraph 32:
Guarantee the equal enjoyment of the right to adequate housing for citizens and non-citizens, especially by avoiding segregation in housing and ensuring that housing agencies refrain from engaging in discriminatory practices.
Reports of appalling housing conditions for migrant workers in the UAE who reside in segregated labour camps are widespread. Sometimes this is acknowledged by the UAE government. For example, the Gulf News quotes Rajeh Al Fahel, head of the Health Education Section at the Ministry of Health, who stated he was "shocked at the conditions the men in workers accommodation … live in". 115 A further report asserts that "cramped living conditions and poor wages make migrant workers 'highly susceptible' to communicable diseases which often develop into serious health problems"; the reference to a health risk was in the context of "the Al Mussafah labour accommodation area where an estimated 12,000 workers often share cramped rooms containing up to 20 beds".
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Th e UAE government insists that accommodation is the responsibility of companies. Th e Gulf News quotes "Assistant Undersecretary for Labour Hatim al Junaibi [who] recognises that there are health problems that must be attributed to the living conditions of migrant workers and insists it is the responsibility of the labour companies". 117 Th is is in violation of the government's obligations under Article 5 of the Convention, which holds the state responsible for ensuring the right to housing is granted without racial discrimination. CERD General Recommendation XXX uses the word "segregation" in relation to housing, and stresses that this must be avoided. Th e atrocious policy of constructing "labour camps" in the UAE represents a practice of de facto segregation between citizens and non-citizens, in which housing conditions for non-citizen workers are signifi cantly worse. 118 Th is practice further represents a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which states:
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.
In 1995, the Committee issued General Recommendation XIX on Racial Segregation and Apartheid, stating in its paragraph 1 that "the reference to apartheid may have been directed exclusively at South Africa, but the article as adopted prohibits all forms of racial segregation in all countries".
119 Th e Recommendation represents a re-interpretation of the Convention provision on apartheid to cover instances of segregation in housing.
120 Th e "labour camps" and conditions therein for migrant workers in the UAE represent a violation of Article 3 in this regard.
Section V of General Recommendation XXX incorporates seven paragraphs detailing the rights of non-citizens in relation to the adminstration of justice, and calls on states parties in its paragraph 18 to "ensure that non-citizens enjoy equal protection and recognition before the law". Th e Convention emphasies this obligation in Article 5(a), which upholds "[t]he right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice".
As highlighted above, in response to recent protests against migrant workers' conditions in the UAE, severe restraints will be placed on migrant workers with regard to access to justice. As reported by the Gulf News , "[w]orkers who protest on fl imsy grounds will be taken to courts".
121 Th e Dubai panel discussed above also warned of "referring workers to court if they protested without a genuine, legal grievance, 'with no right'…". 122 Such rulings grant eff ective immunity to the authorities to not only declare protests unfounded, but to prosecute anyone engaged in such activities. Th e denial of access to justice and punishment of migrant workers who protest appears systematic. For example, "[i]n at least one previous protest, a cleaning company was 118) Ibid. Th is report from the Gulf News , entitled 'Labourers Forced to Share Space with Rodents', describes the conditions in a labour camp occupied by 250 migrant workers. It notes that "poor workers fi nd it very diffi cult to maintain a hygenic environment because of lack of resources and atrocious living conditions …". reported to have fi red several men who staged a protest for unpaid wages, leading to their repatriation. Th e source said … where workers unfairly protest, something has to be done."
123 Th e general reluctance on behalf of workers to make a complaint has also been underlined. Th e closing of access to justice for migrant workers in the UAE represents an infringement of Article 5(a) and is a racially discriminatory practice in violation of the UAE's Convention obligations.
A minimum wage of AED 3,000 to AED 5,000 has been fi xed for citizens of the UAE. 124 Th ere is no minimum wage for non-citizens. Paragraph 4 of General Recommendation XXX states:
Under the Convention, diff erential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such diff erentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.
It is submitted that not extending the minimum wage to non-citizens does not satisfy any criteria pursuant to a legitimate aim under the Convention, and is a clear instance of racial discrimination, as defi ned in Article 1, in violation of the UAE's Convention obligations.
Th e UAE has acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and has indicated its willingness in theory to respect the provisions of the Convention by submitting to the reporting procedure. Nevertheless, the treatment of migrant workers appears to infringe the Convention's clear requirement that non-citizens be protected from racial discrimination. Th e three areas examined above represent a brief overview of a wider pattern of racial discrimination in all areas of socio-economic life in the UAE towards non-citizen migrant workers. General Recommendation XXX, and the continued work of CERD in its examination of state reports, consistently emphasises the need to protect non-citizens as an essential component in the elimination of all forms of racial discrimiantion. With regard to housing, access to justice and the minimum wage, migrant workers continue to suff er racial discrimination in the UAE. Th e UAE must respect its obligations under the 1965 Convention.
Th e Convention on the Rights of the Child
Th e UAE has submitted one report under the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, its most recent engagement with any UN treaty-monitoring body. 
Th e Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
Th e UAE acceded to the Convention in October 2004, but has not reported to its monitoring body, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Th e treatment of domestic workers raises serious questions as to the UAE's compliance with its Convention requirements. Human Rights Watch has stressed the need to "amend Articles 25-35 of the proposed UAE labour law to repeal all limitations on the employment of women".
128 Th ere is a history of abuse against domestic workers, overwhelmingly female, in the UAE: Domestic workers, excluded even from the protections of existing UAE labour law, report a long list of abuses committed by employers and labour agents, including forced confi nement in the workplace; non-payment of wages for months or years; and excessively long working hours with no rest days. In some cases domestic workers experience physical or sexual abuse, or are trapped in situations of forced labour.
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Th e full implementation of the Convention in the UAE is an urgent requirement. Th ere is a dearth of information in relation to the problems faced by domestic workers, but some cases have been described in the media.
Th e Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants
Th e UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has raised a number of serious individual cases in the UAE with regard to the treatment of migrant workers. Th ese cases are necessarily of grave concern, and it is only the most exceptional situations that will come to the Rapporteur's attention. It is submitted that systematic discrimination against migrant workers underlies the more extreme examples that are found in several of the Special Rapporteur's annual reports. It is essential that the UAE invites the Special Rapporteur to assess the situation. Th e following are three brief examples of cases that have come to the Special Rapporteur's attention.
On 9 March 2000, the Special Rapporteur sent an urgent appeal jointly with the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions regarding the case of Kartini bint Karim, an Indonesian immigrant in the UAE. According to the information received, the woman was employed as a domestic servant in Fujairah and became pregnant in 1999, as a result of which her employers accused her of adultery. She was brought before the local authorities and gave birth during her detention. Appearing without legal representation, she was tried by the city court of Syriah Fujairah, which sentenced her to death by stoning. According to the information received, Kartini bint Karim did not receive information or consular assistance. Th e Special Rapporteur requested the government of the United Arab Emirates to commute Kartini bint Karim's sentence and release her. In a letter dated 14 April 2000, the government of the UAE reported to the Special Rapporteur on the case. Th e letter specifi ed that the Indonesian authorities in the country had been informed and that Kartini bint Karim had received legal assistance. Th e Special Rapporteur received information from the source that Kartini bint Karim had been released and had returned to Indonesia.
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Th e death of Alishir Muradov of Tajikistan is raised in the Special Rapporteur's 2004 report. Reportedly, the mother of Mr. Muradov requested the city attorney of Dushanbe to issue an order to exhume the body and conduct medical expertise. Th e report continues:
Since her son was in general good health conditions and he had complained about discrimination at the work-place , she was concerned that he might have been killed. 131 Th e government of the United Arab Emirates has strongly refuted the claims, stating Mr. Murodov died of natural causes.
132 Th e Special Rapporteur off ered no comment on the veracity of the case. 133 It is interesting to note that the government of Tajikistan was suffi ciently concerned so that "based on the medical expertise, the Attorney General of the Republic of Tajikistan initiated a criminal case on the killing of Alisher Murodov". 134 Despite two note verbales from the government of Tajikistan requesting a joint medical expertise on the body by experts of the two countries, no response has been received. 135 In her 2005 annual report, the Special Rapporteur questioned the UAE about the specifi c case of Halil Yilmaz, a Turkish migrant, to which no reply was received.
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In its resolution 2000/48, the Commission on Human Rights requested the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants to include in her work schedule a programme of visits with a view to improving the protection aff orded to the human rights of migrants, thus implementing as broadly and fully as possible all aspects of her mandate. Article 8 of the resolution
[e]ncourages Governments to give serious consideration to inviting the Special Rapporteur to visit their countries so as to enable her to fulfi l her mandate eff ectively.
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Th e UAE should invite the Special Rapporteur to conduct a country visit to inspect allegations of abuse and discrimination. It is extremely unlikely that it will do so. Th e Special Rapporteur may also request such an invitation, and ought to do so given the absence of fundamental rights aff orded to migrant workers and the failure to implement domestic protections. Such a request would place pressure on the UAE to open its labour practices up to international scrutiny.
Bonded Labour/Slavery
Th e existence of bonded labour and slavery in the UAE is relatively unexplored. Practices governing the recruitment of migrant workers and subsequent employment procedures signal a cycle of debt bondage that has not been offi cially acknowledged. However, there has been one instance in which the practice of slavery in the UAE has been directly confronted and condemned by the international community.
In citrance in the enforcement of its decrees outlawing the use of child camel jockeys. 138 Th e practice of using children as camel jockeys, most coming from impoverished South Asian states such as Pakistan, was outlawed in the country in 1980 under the Federal Labour Code. Yet, despite a further 1993 presidential ban from the former ruler Shaikh Zayed, Anti-Slavery International obtained photographs of children clearly younger than 12 working as camel jockeys as late as 2004. In pursuance of the issue, a 2007 class action lawsuit was brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 in the United States, directly accusing the ruler of Dubai, Shaikh Mohammed Al Makhtoum, of being responsible for the enslavement of thousands of boys from South Asia and Africa. 139 As a result, the UAE determined to settle the question of camel jockeys before the case could develop in the US courts. Shaikh Makhtoum, leader of Dubai, made a personal and very public plea to US President George W. Bush for help in dismissing the lawsuit brought by the US attorneys, from the lawfi rm Motley Rice. 140 Association with the issue of child slavery strongly aff ected the government of Dubai, which is aware of the importance of its image, and it retains the services of a US-based strategic and crisis public relations fi rm as a result. 141 Th e case of the camel jockeys before the US courts was recently dismissed on grounds of jurisdiction. While this particular issue saw prompt remedial action on the part of the UAE government, slavery, albeit in a less egregious, less emotive form than that of child camel jockeys, is a persistent reality in the United Arab Emirates. Th e following section explores the question of slavery and its corollarly, bonded labour, as it aff ects migrant workers in the UAE, and how this practice continues without national or international intervention despite legal requirements.
State Responsibility for Slavery/Debt Bondage
Slavery is a crime against humanity and an established norm of customary international law or jus cogens . 142 Th e two most signifi cant international documents relating to slavery are the Slavery Convention of 1926, 143 and the Additional Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956.
144 Th e Slavery Convention defi nes slavery as follows:
1. Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. 2. Th e slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.
Th e 1956 Supplementary Convention reiterated the 1926 Convention's defi nition of slavery, adding a defi nition of persons of servile status, in reference to persons subject to the practices of debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage and the sale or inheritance of female members of the family. Article 1(a), relating to institutions and practices similar to slavery, defi nes debt bondage as follows:
Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defi ned.
While private individuals or criminal elements in global society control the trade in slaves, states retain responsibility to eradicate the practice where it occurs. Similarly, states hold responsibility for debt bondage if they fail to enact and enforce domestic protections. Th ere is no example of legalised slavery or debt bondage existing in the world; yet, this does not imply that the practice does not occur, nor that States do not have obligations to prevent it. As Rassam points out: "Although no state denies a juridical personality to any individual subjected to these practices by explicitly recognizing legal ownership of him or her by other persons, the victims of these practices are indeed susceptible to ownership by others because of state complicity or lack of enforcement of domestic laws." Th e term 'international responsibility' in article 1 covers the relations which arise under international law from the internationally wrongful act of a State, whether such relations are limited to the wrongdoing State and one injured State or whether they extend to other subjects of international law.
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Th erefore, states have a responsibility not only to other States for their acts, but also to other subjects of international law, such as international organisations, national liberation movements and, crucially, individuals.
148 Article 2 defi nes wrongful acts as follows:
Th ere is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: Positive obligations of states are an emerging principle of international law, as fi rst outlined before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the VelasquezRodriguez case, 149 and formalised in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles. When these principles are applied to the rights of individuals, the continued development of the doctrine of state responsibility is of great relevance to the issue of slavery. International legal doctrine leads to the conclusion that debt bondage is a form of slavery, and states have positive obligations to prevent it. 
Debt Bondage in the UAE
Th ere is strong evidence to suggest that slavery, in the form of debt bondage, is widespread in the United Arab Emirates. Th ere is also evidence that the government of the UAE is failing in its positive obligations to stop the practice of debt bondage within its borders and prosecute those responsible. Furthermore, the government itself is an active participant in the abuse of migrant workers, and is central to a situation of control and debt bondage between employers and employees.
Th ere is little scholarly research in general articles on the situation in the Gulf on contemporary forms of slavery; however, some references to the UAE have been made. Th us, Miers describes how "[d]ebt bondage is not limited to poor countries. It also occurs, for instance, in the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf." 150 Furthermore, Rassam notes: "Immigrant domestic workers often fi nd themselves in a situation akin to bonded laborers when employers -in countries such as Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia -confi scate their passports." 151 In November 2006, Human Rights Watch released a report entitled Building Towers, Cheating Workers 152 detailing the appalling working and living conditions faced by the migrant construction workers of Dubai, one of the seven emirates which collectively comprise the United Arab Emirates. Despite limiting its scope to the construction workers of Dubai (who number approximately 500,000 out of a total migrant workforce of 2,738,000), 153 the report can legitimately claim to be the fi rst in-depth, on-the-ground study of labour practices in the Arabic Gulf by an organisation of international standing. An aspect of the report describes the situation facing construction workers in Dubai as one of "forced labour".
Th ere is no precise understanding of the meaning of debt bondage; however, researchers for the ILO Social Finance Programme conducted a study into debt bondage in India, 154 described by one scholar as "a signifi cant step forward in our understanding of this form of slavery", 155 and identifi ed factors which "contributed signifi cantly to debt bondage".
156 Th ese include: assymetric information, fi nancial and labour market monopolies, multiple roles of employers and in-kind linkages. Although the 2006 Human Rights Watch report is careful to avoid any direct reference to debt bondage, when we compare its fi ndings to the fi ndings of the ILO report, these "contributing factors" are apparent in the UAE.
Th e ILO report describes the fi rst factor, that of "assymetric information", as follows: "Families vulnerable to bondage are generally illiterate. Th ere is an inverse correlation between a family's understanding of its contractual relationship with the employer and its vulnerability to bondage." 157 In its response to the draft labour law of 2007, Human Rights Watch stated that "unscrupulous employers and labor recruiters at times take advantage of migrant workers' language barriers, lack of familiarity with local law and practice, and fear of dismissal and deportation to deceive migrant workers about their terms of employment, including type of work, salary, and working conditions". 158 In their report on construction workers, a similar observation was made: "Th e majority of migrant construction workers are illiterate and unaware of their rights in the UAE." 159 Secondly, with regard to "fi nancial and labour market monopolies", the ILO report states: "Employers have signifi cant leverage to link the labour and credit contracts and to defi ne the loan terms. Some employers actively entice workers to take a loan as it allows them to trap the labourers in a cycle of indebtedness and exploitation." 160 Th e Ministry of Labour is outspoken on the issue of recruitment agents, threatening closure via the press, 161 but in reality little is done to curb these agents' activities. According to Human Rights Watch: "[Th e UAE government], having made a point of passing a law that bans both local recruitment agencies and local employers from charging workers any fee in connection with the recruitment or employment process, has made little eff ort to punish recruiting agents who persist in making these charges, or the employers who are complicit." 162 Th irdly, the ILO Report highlights the "multiple roles of employers": "Multiple social and political roles of employers (or their relatives) in the community also appear to increase the vulnerability of labourers to exploitation. Direct or indirect infl uence in locally elected bodies and/or in the law and order system (police/ judiciary) allows employers to prevent labourers from taking legal action." 163 Several factors combine to ensure migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to this type of discrimination in the UAE. Due to domestic laws on business ownership, quotas on the number of UAE nationals in the public sector and in the law and order system and the deeply tribal composition of Emirati society, Emirati nationals and extended members of large families fi ll multiple crucial roles.
Every business in the UAE, except those within government-run free trade zones, must be majority owned by a UAE national. In addition, the country's Emiratisation programme 164 has put quotas on the number of UAE nationals who must be employed in the public sector and certain parts of the private sector. Bodies such as the police and the Ministry of Labour are staff ed with UAE nationals. A situation exists, therefore, where UAE nationals, who comprise a mere fi ve per cent of the country's workforce, 165 own almost all of the enterprises in the country and hold positions of absolute authority in the law and order system.
Th e tribal nature of Emirati society further increases the likelihood of nepotism. In the UAE, "a person's individual existence is embedded in his [tribal] group, which is committed to him because of their common descent. Th e members of this group of common descent have a corporate responsibility to provide support and protection." 166 Tribal groups can be extremely large given that a person's tribal name "could also be the name of a forebear of countless generations back, who is considered the 'patron' or eponym of the many groups of families, which see themselves as his off spring". 167 Human Rights Watch found clear evidence of collusion between the law and order system and enterprises:
Some of the ministry [of labour]'s arbitrators have been accused of protecting the interests of construction companies… Human Rights Watch has not been able to document a single instance when an employer was sanctioned, either by prison time or fi nancial penalties, for failing to pay its workers.
whereas monetary benefi ts would allow workers to make basic life choices." 169 Th e key issue here is one of reliance on an employer for basic necessities.
Migrant workers in the UAE are dependent on their employer for housing and health. Article 85 of the UAE draft labour law 170 requires employers to cover the costs of workers' healthcare, including coverage of migrant workers on arrival. As this excerpt from the Human Rights Watch report underlines, workers are entirely dependent on their employers:
While employers may 'switch contracts', the workers have no freedom to initiate a change of job and go to a diff erent employer. For a migrant worker, changing jobs within the UAE is a cumbersome, bureaucratic process and requires the consent of the original employer. To begin with, labor regulations require a worker to have completed two years of service with his current employer before being entitled to switch employers. He may seek only the same kind of job, and there must be no UAE national available for the job. Most signifi cantly, in order to move to a new employer, a worker must obtain a 'letter of no objection' from his current employer and request the Ministry of Labor to reregister his visa and work permit in the name of the new employer. Th e fact that employers usually hold on to workers' passports makes it even more diffi cult for the worker to switch jobs. 171 A worker who attempts to change employers without the consent of his current employer therefore runs the risk of losing shelter, access to healthcare and the means to feed himself. Employers do not so much promote dependency as create absolute dependency.
Th e workers themselves are in no doubt as to their status. A Dubai psychiatrist, commenting on the suicide of a worker whose employer had withheld his wages and refused to give him money for medical treatment, commented:
When these workers reach here and they realize what they have gotten themselves into and see that they've lost everything, they react to it. Th ey feel trapped as they now know they can't go back either. Th ere's no escape. Th ey know that they are in a bonded labor type of situation and are reacting to what they think is the biggest mistake in their life, an irreparable loss. It is the reaction to this loss which can lead to suicidal contemplation. 172 Th e issue of whether or not it is a contemporary or a classic form of slavery is of limited importance for, as Bales points out, "[y]ou can no more expect historical forms of slavery in contemporary societies than you can expect to fi nd 19th century forms and expressions of social class".
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It is currently impossible to put a fi gure on exactly what proportion of the UAE's 2.78 million migrant workers are enslaved, but it is clear that many are. Th e UAE is in breach of its responsibilities to stamp out the practice. Debt bondage is being perpetrated by agents and sponsors with the tacit consent of the UAE government.
Collusion Between Government and Employers
It is underestimating the problem to hold that the UAE's responsibility for instances of slavery on its territory hinges solely on its failure to meet its erga omnes obligations, or its positive obligations to address the abuses of non-state actors, as outlined in Article 2 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In the United Arab Emirates, as in other Gulf states against whom many of the same accusations could be levelled, the line between state and non-state actors is blurred. In Dubai, this is the situation, to such an extent that the federal government of Dubai is regularly credited with making takeover bids for private enterprises, 184 and openly exhorts its prominent role in the booming construction business. In October 2005, the Gulf News reported that the value of construction contracts in the Gulf was USD 221.4 billion. It outlined the role of government agencies in the business:
Government entities such as Dubai Municipality, Dubai Properties, Nakheel, Department of Civil Aviation, Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (Dewa) and Emaar Properties are leading all the development activities with the private sector involved to a much lesser extent. Among the leading government organisations, Nakheel has the largest project portfolio with Dh110 billion ($30 billion) currently under development.
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Not only is the state failing to meet its obligations to stop debt bondage, it is an active participant in the abuse, and one of the principal benefi ciaries. As Human 183) Bales, supra note 155, p. 326. 184) Th e most recent and high-profi le example was the attempt by Dubai International Capital, regularly referred to as a "state-owned equity fi rm", to buy a controlling stake in Liverpool Football Club in England. See further at <football.guardian.co.uk/News_Story/0,,1964137,00.html>. Rights Watch points out, the country's labour laws are ostensibly strong, 186 but the lack of proper enforcement mechanisms and the proscription of trade unions render those laws obsolete, thus underpinning an exploitative labour market which leaves its unskilled workers open to systematic abuse by private individuals. Th e UAE's failure to include provisions on freedom of association and collective bargaining in its draft labour law of 2007, despite repeated promises to introduce trade union legislation, provides further proof of a government aware of a problem but unwilling to act, because to do so would have serious fi nancial repercussions for the powerful families who run both the country and its most profi table enterprises.
Conclusion
Th e paper has given an overview of a system of exploitation that is taking place in one of the wealthiest states in the world. It has provided a legal analysis of protections in place for migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates. By contrast, it has sought to provide reasons as to why those protections are not working. Th ere are no states in the world which legalise exploitation of workers and debt bondage. Yet, it would be naive to presume that this has resulted in the elimination of these practices. Th e task of human rights organisations and international institutions is to monitor the implementation of law, and oversee how eff ective legal provisions are in achieving their formal aims, whether de facto as well as de jure protection is achieved.
Th e UAE government off ers a smokescreen of legal regulation to cover the abuse of migrant workers taking place on its territory. Section 2 has given an outline of those laws, and has looked at examples of how they fail the majority of the people they are designed to protect: migrant workers, who constitute 95 per cent of the labour population. On a range of issues, such as health and safety, and complaints procedures, egregious violations of rights are occurring. Th e draft labour law proposed in February 2007 again fails to provide proper remedies. Given the scale of the abuse taking place, the UAE must accept that migrant workers' need to organise. If the myriad of problems and obstacles facing them are to be tackled, they must have the ability to form unions. Th ere is no evidence that the UAE will allow this. It must be accepted by the international community as a result that the UAE has no will to treat its migrant workers justly and humanely.
Th is is a case which requires international intervention. Some has already taken place, as examined in Section 3 -the treaty bodies and charter bodies of the United Nations have, to some extent, questioned the UAE as to its treatment of migrant workers. Th us far, the approach has been uncoordinated. Th e UN bodies must provide robust protections for migrant workers. Th is should be spearheaded by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, who must request an invitation to visit the UAE. If the UAE government wishes to contradict the body of evidence presented in this paper, in two Human Rights Watch reports and in the daily litany of cases reported in local and national newspapers, it should give serious consideration to issuing an invitation. If it does not do so then it is submitted that it is acknowledging the violations taking place. From the point of view of the international treaties, violations of the UAE obligations under the International Covention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women have been described. Finally, the ILO has a signifi cant role in engaging the UAE, and moving the state towards accepting the need for unions.
Section 4 notes that bonded labour is endemic in the UAE, in violation of customary norms of jus cogens . Th is form of slavery means that migrant workers spend several years working to pay back debts over which they have no control. Th ese periods of labour are a signifi cant violation of the 1926 and 1956 conventions on slavery. Th e obligations to prevent debt bondage exist erga omnes . Yet, no steps are taken to prevent a practice which is widespread.
Th e involvement of the government in the system of exploitation is the reason why domestic UAE labour laws will never be eff ective. Th e government is deeply involved in industry, and the line between private and public enterprise is so blurred that it must be considered non-existent. Th e UAE government is profi ting enormously from migrant labour, and has no incentive to improve workers' rights. Th is is extremely diffi cult to justify. It is shameful in a state of untold wealth that the most basic rights are not granted to migrant workers. In the interests of common justice, improvements must be immediately made to conditions of accommodation, working times in summer, safety regulations, holidays and complaints procedures. Moreover, equal status must be granted to domestic workers, almost exclusively women, who have no protection.
Th e UAE would gain stability by granting the right to form unions. It would gain respect in the international community, which it desperately seeks. Its tourist industry would not be tainted by newspaper accounts of fi lthy prison-like camps, suicides and Dickensian hardship. Yet, it seems that wealth is more important than all of this; indeed, the relatively small benefi ts accrued by refusing migrant workers basic rights are preferred. Th is problem, unlike many problems facing the world, can be solved. It is simple greed preventing the UAE from doing so. Sustained international criticism is required if meaningful change is to result.
